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Abstract—This work addresses forgery localization in MPEG-2
compressed videos. The proposed method is based on the anal-
ysis of Double Quantization (DQ) traces in frames that were
encoded twice as intra (i.e., I-frames). Employing a state-of-the-
art method, such frames are located in the video under analysis
by estimating the size of the Group Of Pictures (GOP) that was
used in the first compression; then, the DQ analysis is devised
for the MPEG-2 encoding scheme and applied to frames that
were intra-coded in both the first and second compression. In
such a way, regions that were manipulated between the two
encodings are detected. Compared to existing methods based on
double quantization analysis, the proposed scheme makes forgery
localization possible on a wider range of settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Images and videos are probably the most important media
in everyday’s communications. They also became important
in fields like medicine, military and security, so the possibility
of knowing their provenience and certifying their credibility
is of great interest. A number of techniques to investigate the
processing history of digital contents are emerging, under the
name of Multimedia Forensics; these techniques exploit the
fact that some imperceptible traces are left in the media during
its acquisition, modification and compression.
The research community started working on images first,
and a huge number of methods exist today for analyzing
the authenticity of images (a recent survey is given in [1]).
On the contrary, video forensics is still an emerging field,
for several reasons: creating fake images is much easier than
creating fake videos; images are usually available either in
uncompressed or JPEG format, while videos can be encoded
with many different schemes and, finally, videos usually
undergo a stronger compression compared to images, making
their forensic analysis more difficult. This contrasts with the
fact that nowadays digital videos are probably used more than
images for security tasks (just think about video-surveillance
MMSP’13, Sept. 30 - Oct. 2, 2013, Pula (Sardinia), Italy.
978-1-4799-0125-8/13/$31.00 c©2013 IEEE.
systems), so their trustability must be strengthened.
As it will be shown in Section III, a great deal of the
research activity in video forensics focused on detection of
double compression. Although double compression can be
considered a necessary step for creating a tampered video, say-
ing that a sequence has been encoded twice is not a sufficient
proof for claiming its non-authenticity: it may be the case,
for example, that the video is automatically re-encoded when
it is downloaded from the acquisition device. For this reason,
investigating the authenticity of a digital video requires to take
one more step in the analysis. Furthermore, a distinction must
be made between intra-frame and inter-frame video forgeries
[2]: in the former, the attacker changes the content of some
frames (e.g., by adding or removing an object), while in the
latter one or more frames are entirely added/removed from the
video. It is easy to guess that different techniques are needed
to investigate these two tampering scenarios.
This paper presents a method for forgery localization in
the frames of a MPEG-2 compressed video, that is, a method
allowing to determine which parts of a frame have been
altered. The method basically works by searching for traces of
double quantization at a spatial level, allowing to build a fine-
grained probability map of tampering for each analyzed frame.
This is done by adapting and extending the method proposed in
[3] to the MPEG-2 encoding scheme. Due to how the MPEG-
2 encoding is performed, this kind of analysis is only possible
on frames that have been intra-coded1 twice. Therefore, we
first adopt a state-of-the-art method for localizing the position
of such frames in the first encoding, and then perform the
proposed analysis on the suitable frames.
Compared to state-of-the-art approaches targeting the same
task, the proposed method achieves forgery localization under
more realistic working scenarios (e.g., video encoded using
motion prediction, that are the vast majority), and exploits
some advantages of the MPEG-2 encoding standard to improve
the robustness of the analysis.
1Intra-coding is described in Section II.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section II makes a very
brief tour on MPEG-2 compression, then related works are
considered in Section III; the proposed method is explained
in Section IV and experimentally validated in Section V.
II. MPEG-2 VIDEO COMPRESSION
MPEG-2 video standard (ISO/IEC 13818-2/ITU-T recom-
mendation H.262) is a widely employed method for video
compression, that basically works by reducing both spatial
and temporal redundancy in a captured video sequence. The
standard follows a block-based hybrid video coding approach
and defines different types of pictures: intra-coded pictures,
referred to as I-frames (only progressive videos are con-
sidered on this paper), and predictive-coded pictures, com-
monly named P-frames and B-frames. Given the block-based
structure, each frame of a video sequence is divided into
macroblocks (MBs), i.e., blocks of 16×16 samples, which
are encoded following several coding modes that are available
according to the selected type of frame.
In a similar way as it happens with JPEG images, the MBs
in I-frames are encoded without making reference to other
frames: each MB of the luminance component (we do not
consider the chrominance for brevity) is divided in blocks
of 8×8 pixels that are transformed according to the DCT
and whose coefficients are later quantized (details about this
step will be given in Section IV). Quantization in the DCT
domain allows to remove spatial redundancy in a perceptually
convenient way.
By compressing the whole video using only intra-coded
pictures, this would lead to the so-called Motion-JPEG encod-
ing, where temporal redundancy is not exploited. Notice that,
although being very similar to the JPEG compression scheme,
the mentioned procedure uses a slightly different quantization
function. In MPEG-2, the coarseness of the quantization is
selected by the encoder through the quantizer scale factor,
denoted as Q, that ranges from 0 to 31 and maps the values
of the multiplier k that is applied to the quantization matrix.
Two different mappings are available in the standard, but in
this paper we will assume the one that corresponds to k = 2Q
(except for Q = 0, where no value is assigned to k). Therefore,
by fixing the multiplier to a certain value, the factor Q enables
to control the trade-off between the quality and bitrate of a
compressed video. If the value of Q is constant, then a fixed
quantizer will be used and a Variable BitRate (VBR) will be
provided; while if it is adapted on a frame to frame (or even
on a MB to MB) basis, then a Constant BitRate (CBR) can
be achieved.
In a general scenario, a strong correlation between adjacent
frames will be present since the scene is captured at several
frames per second, and this temporal redundancy should be
exploited to increase the level of compression. This is obtained
through motion compensation. For instance, when encoding a
picture as a P-frame, each MB is compared with the respective
area in neighborhood positions within the previous encoded
and reconstructed frame (i.e., a reference frame), in order
to find the region that better resembles the MB to encode.
If a good match is found, then the MB is predictive-coded:
the displacement vector (i.e., a motion vector) is stored and
the residual difference with the reference MB is 8×8-DCT
transformed and further quantized. However, if a good match
is not available, then the MB is intra-coded like in an I-
frame and we will refer to this type of macroblock as I-MB.
Finally, if after performing the predictive-coding there is no
need to transmit the motion vector (because it is null) and
the residual difference after quantization is also negligible,
then the standard defines a specific type of macroblock, called
skipped MB and we will address to it as S-MB.
The only difference between P- and B-frames is that the
MBs on B-frames can be bidirectionally predictive-coded, in
such a way that the motion compensation can be carried out
from a past and/or a future reference frame.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS
Although not being as much advanced as for images,
the forensic analysis of digital videos already counts several
achievements. Only previous works that are related to the pro-
posed method are mentioned in this section, while a thorough
overview and taxonomy of video forensic techniques can be
found in [2].
One of the most studied tasks in video forensics is the
detection of double encoding and/or transcoding, probably
because a tampered video is usually encoded (at least) twice,
namely during the acquisition and after the manipulation.
Several works are based on the effects introduced by double
quantization in the DCT coefficients. In [4], the I-frames of
the video are considered and the histogram of two quantized
DCT coefficients is studied in order to search a convex
pattern, that characterizes double-encoded videos. By adopting
a simple yet effective approach, the method is extended also
to the challenging CBR case: macroblocks are separated in
different sets, according to their quantization parameter, and
the analysis is carried separately for each set. An approach
based on Benford’s law is presented in [5], where the first-
digit distribution of DCT coefficients of I-frames is considered
and a 12-dimensional feature is extracted to be classified using
Support Vector Machines. Besides detecting double encoding,
the method also classifies the second encoding as being at
a higher or lower bitrate with respect to the first one. On the
other hand, this method may not work when the two encodings
are performed using different implementation of the MPEG-2
standard.
Generalizing also to other video coding standards, a very
recent work has been published about double encoding de-
tection for MPEG-4 videos [6], based on Markov statistics
extracted from DCT coefficients. Recently, Benford’s law
together with SVMs has been employed by authors of [7]
for detecting multiple (i.e., even more than two) encodings
of the same video. Finally, a completely different method
to detect double video encoding has been proposed in [8],
where the authors show that when a video is encoded twice, a
characteristic behavior appears in those P-frames that are the
re-encoded version of the I-frames of the original sequence.
MMSP2013495
2
The method works both when VBR and CBR coding is used
and, noticeably, also works when different codecs are used in
performing the two compressions.
So far we have only mentioned works targeting the detection
of double compression. Switching to tampering detection, an
effective method for detecting removal of frames was proposed
in [9], where the de-synchronization (induced by the tamper-
ing) between the GOP used for the first and for the second
encoding is detected, by searching for a periodic behavior in
the magnitude of motion vectors. Another method is presented
in [10], where the different characteristics of quantization
matrices employed for intra- and predictive- coded frames is
considered: if an I-frame is re-encoded as P or B, a different
quantization matrix will be used that preserves more energy
in the high-frequency DCT coefficients. This fact is studied
to detect periodic anomalies in the energy of some DCT
coefficients, thus exposing that a de-synchronization in the
GOP structure occurred. Finally, authors of [4] show that their
method for double encoding detection can also be used to
detect frame removal.
Intra-frame forgery localization is probably the less stud-
ied field in video forensics today, and most of the existing
approaches work only under strict assumptions [2]. The most
recent method is the one proposed in [11], where a DQ analy-
sis is applied separately for each macroblock. The underlying
idea is that when some of the MBs of a frame show the
effects of double quantization and some others do not, the
last ones have been probably pasted from another sequence.
This idea is borrowed from JPEG image forensics and, as
such, the analysis makes sense only on frames that have been
encoded twice as intra. The authors work around this problem
by assuming that Motion-JPEG encoding has been performed
(i.e., only intra-coded pictures are used), thus heavily restrict-
ing the applicability of the method. Furthermore, in [11] the
double quantization analysis is performed separately on each
MB, leading to a computationally intensive analysis.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we present a new method for localizing
forgeries in MPEG-2 videos. We focus on the intra-frame
forgery scenario, and we assume that, starting from a MPEG-2
video sequence, the attacker decodes the video, alters the
content of a group of frames, and finally encodes the resulting
sequence again with MPEG-2, using a different GOP size. In
the following, we assume a fixed quantizer and that the default
quantization matrix is employed, leading to a VBR coding.
The approach makes use of the method presented in [8] to
retrieve the GOP size of the first compression. By knowing
this, the location of the I-frames in the first encoding is
inferred and the DQ effect is studied in those frames that have
been encoded as intra both in the first and second encoding.
In this work, we do not consider the removal/addition of
whole frames: this would cause a misalignment in the GOP
structures, complicating the localization (based on the method
in [8]) of frames that have been encoded twice as intra.
A. Detection of Frames Encoded Twice as Intra
Recently, the Variation of Prediction Footprint (VPF) has
been proposed as a method to detect double video encoding
[8]. This footprint captures a characteristic phenomenon that
occurs when an I-frame is re-encoded as a P-frame: in such a
frame, the number of S-MBs noticeably decreases, while the
number of I-MBs strongly increases. By measuring the pres-
ence and the periodicity of this phenomenon, an algorithm has
been proposed to detect double compression and to estimate
the size of the GOP used for the first encoding.
Let us assume that a video, composed by N frames, has
been encoded twice using G1 and G2 as the GOP size for
the first and second encoding respectively, where G1 6= m ·
G2,∀m ∈ N. Assuming a fixed GOP structure, the set of
indices of the frames that have been intra-coded twice is
CG1,G2 = {n ∈ N : n = m · lcm(G1,G2) ∧ n ≤ N, ∀m ∈ N},
where lcm(G1,G2) represents the least common multiple
between G1 and G2. The cardinality |CG1,G2 | of the set is
simply given by:
|CG1,G2 | = 1 +
⌊
N
lcm(G1,G2)
⌋
,
where b·c stands for the floor function. In other words, forgery
localization can be performed every lcm(G1,G2) frames.
Therefore, for relatively prime values of G1 and G2 the
analysis can be carried out only once every G1 · G2 frames,
and this value could be not appealing. On the other hand, the
GOP size is usually chosen from a set of possibilities, like 12
for PAL videos, 15 for NTSC videos, while recording devices
often choose a GOP size around 30. At a frame rate of 25 fps,
combinations of the mentioned values for G1 and G2 result in
a satisfactory time resolution for the analysis.
There is one important fact that must be considered to
justify the adoption of the method proposed in [8], since their
experiments are conducted on double encoded videos, without
modifications between the two encodings. On the contrary, we
are assuming that the video is manipulated (by altering the
content of a group of frames) before the second compression
takes place. The robustness of the VPF in this scenario must
be evaluated, and this task will be addressed in Section V.
B. Forgery Localization Based on DQ Analysis
According to the assumed forgery scenario, tampered
frames that have been encoded twice as intra will consist
of two groups of pixels: the one that has not been modified,
thus undergoing a double quantization, and the one that has
been introduced between the encodings. Even when these latter
pixels come from a compressed sequence, they will unlikely be
pasted respecting the 8×8 quantization grid of the host frame
and, therefore, will not show traces of double quantization
after the second encoding, thus making localization possible.
A thorough explanation of this model is given in [12]. That
said, if we consider the histogram of a specific DCT coefficient
(e.g., the one in position (0,1) in all 8× 8 blocks), we should
see a mixture of two components: a comb-shaped component
MMSP2013496
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Fig. 1. Histogram of a DCT coefficient from a single compressed frame
(left), double compressed frame (center) and tampered frame (right). Notice
that the tampered histogram can be seen as a mixture of the previous two.
due to unaltered, double compressed regions, and a “standard”
component due to regions that have been introduced (see
Figure 1). In [3] a Bayesian inference method is proposed that
first assigns to each DCT coefficient of a block its probability
of belonging to each one of these components, and then
accumulates these probabilities for all the coefficients of a
block, producing an aggregated probability for the whole block
of being/not being doubly compressed. The output is a map
associating to each 8 × 8 block of pixels its probability of
being tampered (i.e., not showing the DQ effect) or untouched
(i.e., showing the effect). In order to compute such a map, the
mentioned algorithm basically performs the following steps
(see [3] for a formal presentation) for each group of DCT
coefficients sharing the same position:
1) from the observed DCT coefficients, estimate the his-
togram h˜ that would result after a single encoding with
the quantization step used in the second compression;
2) estimate the quantization step that was used during the
first compression;
3) knowing both quantization steps, compute a function
n(x) that gives the number of bins of the original
histogram that are mapped in the bin corresponding to
the value x in the double quantized histogram.
Then, denoting with H0 and H1 the hypothesis of being
tampered and original, respectively, for each coefficient x
authors in [3] obtain:
p(x|H0) = h˜(x) (1)
and
p(x|H1) = n(x) · h˜(x), x 6= 0. (2)
These steps are carried out separately for each DCT coefficient
(usually only the first dozen of AC coefficients are used for
the analysis). Then, for each 8 × 8 block, the probability of
being tampered is “accumulated” as:
p = 1/
 ∏
i|xi 6=0
ni(xi) + 1
 , (3)
where ni(x) is the n(x) function for the i-th coefficient.
Since DCT coefficients quantization is a key step both
in JPEG and MPEG-2 coding, the above method can been
borrowed from image to video forensics, as suggested in [11].
However, some significant differences must be considered to
devise a correct model for MPEG-2:
1) the dequantization formula in JPEG differs from that of
MPEG-2 [13];
2) in JPEG, the 8 × 8 quantization matrix is declared
in the header and usually it is not governed by the
quality factor; in MPEG-2, instead, the adopted matrix
(the default or a custom one) is parameterized by the
multiplier k (see Section II), to adjust the quantization
strength;
3) in JPEG, the quantization matrix is the same for all
the image; this holds also for MPEG-2 when a fixed
quantizer is used, while the quantization matrix may
change from frame to frame or MB to MB, for instance,
for CBR coding.
Each of these facts has a direct implication on the model
described in [3]. Since a different quantization formula is
used, the function n(x) will likely change; the fact that all
quantization coefficients are obtained multiplying by k makes
it not necessary to estimate a different quantization step for
each coefficient (we can directly estimate k); finally, in the
case of CBR coding, that is left for future work, MBs that are
not quantized using the same k must be analyzed separately.
Inspired by [3], the approach we follow is to model the
histogram of DCT coefficients in tampered frames as a mixture
between a double quantized component and a single quantized
component. To get a reliable estimate of coefficients quantized
only once (by the quantization factor employed in the last
encoding), we make use of the calibration technique [14]: the
frame is cropped by one row and one column, and the result
is quantized with the second quantization matrix. Consistently
with [3], this component will be indicated by h˜(x). Therefore,
given a coefficient x, its probability of belonging to a tampered
region is estimated as in (1).
To get an estimate of the other component, we need to derive
the appropriate function n(x) for the MPEG-2 quantization
scheme. In the following, we denote the never-compressed
DCT coefficient on the i-th row and j-th column of an 8× 8
block with x(i, j), where i, j ∈ {0, . . . , 7}. Similarly, we
denote with u1(i, j) the quantized version of the coefficient,
with x1(i, j) its de-quantized version, and with u2(i, j) its
re-quantized version. We also denote each element in the
8 × 8 quantization matrix with W (i, j), and we call k1
and k2 the multipliers that parameterized the quantization
matrix in the first compression and in the second compression,
respectively. According to the MPEG-2 standard [13], and
following the proposed notation, the de-quantized version of
the DCT coefficients coming from a single compressed intra-
coded frame is:
x1(i, j) = sign (u1(i, j))
⌊
W (i, j) · |u1(i, j)| · k1
16
⌋
(4)
for all coefficients apart from the DC, where |·| is the absolute
value operator. Starting from (4), the most intuitive way to
define the quantization is:
u1(i, j) =
[
16 · x(i, j)
k1 ·W (i, j)
]
, (5)
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Fig. 2. An intra-frame tampering (left figure) and the produced probability
map (right figure). For showing purposes, a 3 × 3 median filter has been
applied to the map.
where [·] represents the rounding to nearest integer operation.
According to (4) and (5), the re-quantized version of the DCT
coefficients, (i.e., the double quantized coefficients), can be
written (omitting the position indices) as:
u2 =
 16
k2 ·W
sign([ 16 · x
k1 ·W
])W ·
∣∣∣[ 16·xk1·W ]∣∣∣ · k1
16

From this formula, the function n(x) can be proved to be:
n(x) =
k1 ·W
16
(⌈
16
k1 ·W
⌈
k2 ·W
16
(
u2 +
1
2
)⌉⌉
−⌈
16
k1 ·W
⌈
k2 ·W
16
(
u2 − 1
2
)⌉⌉)
, (6)
where d·e denotes the ceiling function. In the above equation,
k1 is the only parameter that must be estimated, given that
k2 and the values of W are available from the bitstream. The
multiplier k1 is defined by its relation with the quantizer scale
factor used in the first encoding Q1 (see Section II), yielding
to a possible value within the set K1 = {2Q1 : 1 ≤ Q1 ≤
31}. If we assume to have the correct k1, the histogram of
doubly quantized coefficients can be obtained from h˜(x) as
n(x; k1) · h˜(x), and we could write the probability distribution
of the observed coefficients as the following mixture:
p(x; k1, α) = α · n(x; k1) · h˜(x) + (1− α) · h˜(x), (7)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. As suggested in [3], an effective way to
get an estimate of k1 is to iteratively search the value kˆ1 that
minimizes the difference between the observed histogram h(x)
and p(x; k1, α), choosing the optimal α in the least square
sense (formula is given in [3]). With respect to the JPEG case,
the minimization is simplified by the fact that the quantization
matrix is known, and all the coefficients share the same k1.
Thus, we define the following vector
h = [h1(−B2 ) . . . h1(−1) h1(1) . . . h1(B2 ) h2(−B2 ) . . . hC(B2 )]T
where B+1 is the number of bins of h(x) and C is the number
of considered coefficients. We similarly define h˜ and n. Then,
we can write:
p(k1, α) = α · n(k1) · h˜ + (1− α) · h˜,
where the product between vectors is made element-by-
element. Finally, kˆ1 is obtained as
kˆ1 = arg min
k1∈K1
||h− p(k1, α)||2.
By using all the coefficients to estimate k1, a more robust
estimation is obtained; this is a crucial benefit, especially if
we consider that: i) values in W are quite high even for small i
and j, ii) the spatial resolution of videos is usually lower than
that of images; and both these facts reduce the number of DCT
coefficients that can be fruitfully exploited for the estimation.
Using kˆ1 and the n(x) function defined in (6) for the MPEG-
2 case, we can compute the probability in (2). Finally, the
probability for each 8×8 block of being tampered is obtained
through equation (3). Figure 2 shows a forged frame along
with the probability map generated by the proposed method.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experiments have been carried out on a set of well known
videos, selected so to have heterogeneous scenes2, cropped
to a resolution of 720×576 pixels. MPEG-2 VBR coding
with a fixed quantizer is performed using the FFmpeg coding
software3.
The experimental validation follows this path: the video is
compressed with a quantizer scale factor Q1; then it is decoded
and a square block of 200×200 pixels is replaced with the
same content coming from the uncompressed version of the
video; finally, the resulting video is re-encoded with a factor
Q2. Using the uncompressed version of the same video as a
source for tampered pixels, it is possible to create a forgery
that is practically imperceptible to the eye, thus mimicking the
work of an editing expert.
Given that performance of the VPF do not strongly de-
pend on the size of GOPs [8], we employed fixed GOP
sizes G1 = 12 and G2 = 15 for the first and second
compression respectively (this choice is motivated in Section
IV-A). Furthermore, we limit ourselves to use P-frames, since
GOP estimation in presence of B-frames is not possible with
the mentioned method. As shown in [3], forgery localization
generally works when the second compression is not as strong
as the first one. For this reason, we choose Q1 ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12},
Q2 ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, and all the possible combinations between
these two sets are used for generating tampered videos. Finally,
since the model proposed in Section IV-B has been derived
assuming that the fixed quantizer is uniform, the dead-zone of
the quantizer implemented in FFmpeg is fixed to the interval
[−∆/2,∆/2] (where ∆ denotes the quantization step), by
setting the parameter ibias equal to 128. Note that the model
can be easily adjusted to work with different dead-zones.
First of all, we have investigated the reliability of the VPF-
based GOP estimation in the considered scenario since, in
the case of a wrong estimation, the proposed method would
fail. The GOP size was retrieved from the available set of
tampered videos and the number of exact estimations of
G1 was calculated. The estimation never failed under the
considered settings, thus confirming that VPF can be safely
used in the proposed chain of analysis.
2Selected videos are: ducks take off, in to tree, old town cross, park joy,
shields, sunflower and touchdown pass, freely available at http://media.xiph.
org/video/derf/.
3http://www.ffmpeg.org/
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Fig. 3. ROC curves obtained for the examined combination of Q1 and Q2. From left to right, increasing values of Q1 are considered, and performance
for varying values of Q2 are plotted (notice that curves have been magnified to improve readability). As expected, lower values for the second compression
facilitate the localization.
After retrieving the GOP size of the first compression
(denoted with Gˆ1) for each tampered video, the DQ analysis
is carried out, specifically in frames indexed by elements
in the set CGˆ1,15, defined in Section IV-A. Only the first
5 AC coefficients in the zig-zag ordering are used for the
analysis. The probability map produced from each frame is
then thresholded and compared to the ground truth mask,
allowing us to calculate the true positive and false positive
rate; these values are averaged over all videos sharing the
same combination of Q1 and Q2. By varying values of the
threshold, for all the explored combinations of Q1 and Q2
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are obtained
(Figure 3) and their Area Under Curve (AUC) is calculated
(Table I) . We see clearly that, for a given Q1, lower values of
Q2 facilitate the localization; on the other hand, higher values
of Q1 favour the performance of the method.
TABLE I
AUC OBTAINED WITH THE PROPOSED METHOD.
PPPPPPQ1
Q2 2 3 4 5
6 0.98 0.97 0.68 0.63
8 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.93
10 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.94
12 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have proposed a method for localizing
forgeries in the frames of a MPEG-2 compressed video. The
method works by first locating frames that have been intra-
coded twice, and then applying a double quantization analysis
to them, based on a proposed model specific for MPEG-2.
As a key contribution, our method exploits the characteris-
tics of MPEG-2 coding, and it is the first allowing to apply
DQ analysis to videos that have been encoded using P-frames.
Experimental results are promising and lay the basis for future
work, that will focus on: i) facing the case where one or
both compressions are at CBR; ii) taking into account the
presence of B-frames, that are currently not supported by the
feature used for GOP estimation; iii) extend the experimental
validation to realistic, hand-made, video forgeries.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was partially supported by the REWIND Project
funded by the Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) pro-
gramme within the 7FP of the European Commission, under
FET-Open grant number 268478.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Piva, “An overview on image forensics,” ISRN Signal Processing,
vol. 2013, 2013.
[2] S. Milani, M. Fontani, P. Bestagini, M. Barni, A. Piva, M. Tagliasacchi,
and S. Tubaro, “An overview on video forensics,” APSIPA Transactions
on Signal and Information Processing, vol. 1, 11 2012.
[3] T. Bianchi, A. De Rosa, and A. Piva, “Improved DCT coefficient analysis
for forgery localization in JPEG images,” in Acoustics, Speech and
Signal Processing (ICASSP), IEEE International Conference on, 2011.
[4] J. Xu, Y. Su, and Q. Liu, “Detection of double MPEG-2 compression
based on distributions of DCT coefficients,” International Journal of
Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 27, no. 01, p.
1354001, 2013.
[5] T. Sun, W. Wang, and X. Jiang, “Exposing video forgeries by detecting
MPEG double compression,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), IEEE International Conference on, 2012, pp. 1389–1392.
[6] X. Jiang, W. Wang, T. Sun, Y. Shi, and S. Wang, “Detection of double
compression in MPEG-4 videos based on Markov statistics,” Signal
Processing Letters, IEEE, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 447–450, 2013.
[7] S. Milani, P. Bestagini, M. Tagliasacchi, and S. Tubaro, “Multiple
compression detection for video sequences,” in Multimedia Signal
Processing (MMSP), IEEE 14th International Workshop on, 2012, pp.
112–117.
[8] D. Vazquez-Padin, M. Fontani, T. Bianchi, P. Comesana, A. Piva, and
M. Barni, “Detection of video double encoding with GOP size estima-
tion,” in Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), IEEE International
Workshop on, 2012, pp. 151–156.
[9] W. Wang and H. Farid, “Exposing digital forgeries in video by detecting
double MPEG compression,” in MM&Sec, 2006, pp. 37–47.
[10] Y. Su, W. Nie, and C. Zhang, “A frame tampering detection algorithm
for MPEG videos,” in Information Technology and Artificial Intelligence
Conference, 6th IEEE Joint International, vol. 2, 2011, pp. 461–464.
[11] W. Wang and H. Farid, “Exposing digital forgeries in video by detecting
double quantization,” in Proceedings of the 11th ACM workshop on
Multimedia and security, ser. MM&Sec ’09. New York, NY, USA:
ACM, 2009, pp. 39–48.
[12] Z. C. Lin, J. F. He, X. Tang, and C. K. Tang, “Fast, automatic and fine-
grained tampered JPEG image detection via DCT coefficient analysis,”
Pattern Recognition, vol. 42, no. 11, pp. 2492–2501, Nov. 2009.
[13] ISO, “Information technology - generic coding of moving pictures and
associated audio information - part 2: Video,” International Organization
for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland, ISO/IEC IS 13818-2, 2008.
[14] J. Luka´sˇ and J. Fridrich, “Estimation of primary quantization matrix
in double compressed JPEG images,” in Digital Forensic Research
Workshop, 2003.
MMSP2013499
6
